

WMDC

THE WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
COMMISSION

www.wmdcommission.org

[Final Speaking notes]

Presentation of the WMDC Final Report in Spanish

Barcelona 11 April

Bilbao 12 April

Madrid 13 April

Dr. Hans Blix, Chairman

April 2007

On the occasion of the publication of the Report of the WMD in Spanish I am pleased to make some comments about the report and the Commission that I chaired.

- Let me first place the threat of WMD **in perspective. They are one part of the problems of human security. There are others:**
- Security against **hunger.**
- Security against **environmental and other natural threats.**
- Security against **oppression** and armed force.

- Some will remind us that **small caliber weapons** are the real weapons of mass destruction. There are more than 500 million of such weapons and they claim the largest number of victims.

- These are real problems of human security and we need to deal with them. So are the **threats of WMD – nuclear, biological and chemical and missiles. To tackle them we need to revive disarmament** on a broad front.

- **During the Cold War**, the number of nuclear warheads peaked at some **55.000**, enough to destroy human civilization many times. People showed their anguish by demonstrations and marching in the streets.

- **After the end of the Cold War** the world drew **a sigh of relief that it** no longer needed fear “the **mutually assured destruction**” – **MAD** -- resulting from a nuclear exchange between superpowers.
- However, **the threats of WMD are still there.**
- There are still some **27.000** nuclear warheads, many of them on hair trigger alert. The **UK** has recently announced that it will prolong its nuclear weapons program for the period beyond 2020 and the **US** administration wants to develop a **new standard nuclear weapon.**
- **Iraq** tried to develop nuclear weapons and used chemical weapons extensively in the war against Iran and also against its own people.
- **North Korea** has tested both a nuclear device and missiles and has increased the tension in North East Asia.
- **Iran** is developing a program for the **enrichment** of uranium. Whether or not it aims to develop nuclear weapons, the program is increasing the tension in the Middle East.
- There are concerns that **terrorists** might acquire nuclear material or make use of BC weapons.
- **We must examine the threats and seek to reduce them.**

[THE COMMISSION on WMD and the OUTLOOK for the REPORT]

- **In the summer of 2003 I returned to my home country, Sweden, after my job to lead UN inspections in Iraq.**
- **The then Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, who was later tragically murdered, asked me to establish an international commission to examine how the world could meet the threats of WMD. I did so.**
- **The WMDC**
 had **14 members** from all over the world, and was **financed** by Swedish government.
 Its **report** “Weapons of Terror, Freeing the world of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms” was **unanimous**.
 It has so far been **translated** into **Spanish**, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese.
 [The introduction, synopsis and recommendations of the Report are printed as *UN Doc: A/60/934 of 2\10 July 2006*]
 [The whole report is found on the Commission’s website: (www.wmdcommission.org)]
- **When I presented the report to UN SG and UN GA President on 1 June 2006 the climate for negotiations and agreements on arms control and disarmament was at an all time low.**

- The **NPT Review Conference** in the spring of 2005 and the **UN World Summit** later the same year had failed to reach any agreement on arms control and disarmament. The UN mechanism for arms control and disarmament negotiations, the **Conference on Disarmament**, in Geneva had not been able to agree on a work program for some ten years.
- However, I thought in 2006 that the excessive faith in unilateral military means to prevent proliferation **would be weakened by the Iraq experience. Almost one year later**, I think this has occurred. There **are some modest signs** that the tide is turning.
- An **article in WSJ** on 4 January by former US Secretaries of State **Kissinger** and **Shultz**, former Secretary of Defense **Mr. Perry** and former Senator **Nunn** **advocates nuclear disarmament. It** appears that a number of well known figures in the US political world support the article.
- However, it will require **much effort** by civic organizations, analysts, media and, indeed, by many governments to move **arms control and disarmament** back on **an agenda to take a place side by side with** the issues of proliferation and terrorism.

[SLEEP-WALKING into NEW ARMS RACES]

- **Kofi Annan has said that the world is ‘sleep walking’ into new arms races.** He is right.
- Recently Europe woke up to hear about **US talks with Poland** and the **Czech Republic** to place elements of the US **‘missile shield’** on their territories. The news provoked strong reactions in Russia, where there may well be **military countermeasures**.
- **Some time ago the Chinese action to** shoot down a **satellite of its own – reminded us that** major powers are preparing themselves for the possibility of a **space war**.
- **If military expenses** is any indication of political climate, we may note that last year they stood at some 1.3 trillion dollars – about **half of it falling on the US**.

[SOME HOPEFUL ELEMENTS]

- Despite the generally gloomy outlook we should also take note of **several positive developments**, especially in the first part of the 90s.
- There has been a **reduction in the number of nuclear warheads** – perhaps mainly the result of getting rid of **redundant weapons**. They are **welcome nevertheless**.
- **In 1993 the Chemical Weapons Convention** was concluded after decades of negotiations.
- **In 1995 the Non-Proliferation Treaty** was prolonged without any final date set for its validity.
- **In 1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed** – **also** after decades of negotiations.

- We may also note that **wars used to be about borders, territory or ideology**. After the end of the Cold War, we do not have such controversies **between major powers**.
- To be sure there are serious regional tensions and conflicts in the Middle East, Kashmir, and Africa and there are civil wars.
- **But we find that interdependence – globalization** – accelerates between all states: health, trade, economy, finance and communications lead to and demand cooperation and common rules and make the threat or use of armed force less likely.
- **Why not disarmament then? Why new generations of nuclear weapons?** Can there be wars about **exchange rates**? About CO2 emissions?
- **Competition** about **oil resources** and about the location of pipe lines is a growing reality but is it not more likely that this competition will play out in the oil prices than in any armed contest about territory?
- **Is rearmament needed to meet terrorism?** Hardly meaningful to build new nuclear weapons or air craft carriers against terrorists.
Like trying to shoot mosquitoes by cannons...
- The conclusion is that **after the Cold War, disarmament can and should be re-launched. There should be a further dismantling of nuclear weapons – not a development of new ones.**

[THE COMMISSION'S REPORT]

- The Commission presents **60 recommendations concerning nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and means of delivering the weapons**. Half of the report and the recommendations deal with **nuclear** weapons.
- Let me **first** touch upon the questions relating to **biological and chemical weapons**.
- **The biological sciences** are developing very fast **and biotechnology** is already giving great **dividends**. At the same time these new human activities raise risks for the production of pathogens as dangerous weapons.
- At the initiative of President **Nixon** the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was concluded during the Cold War, when the superpowers did not see any useful military application of B- weapons.
- During the Cold War the **Soviet Union refused to accept on site inspection** – which it saw as espionage – and the convention, therefore lacks verification mechanism. This enabled both the Soviet **Union and Iraq** to develop biological weapons without the risk of detection. Fortunately, actual use of biological weapons is not easy and no state has made use of them.
- The Commission notes that it is important that the Convention attains **universal adherence** and that more efforts are devoted to **ensure effective implementation**. The scientific world needs be involved through ethical codes.

- For **chemical weapons, the Convention** concluded in 1993 provides a **modern, comprehensive regulation prohibiting production, stocking and use of these weapons.**
- Although the CWC is in reasonably **good shape** and has a modern inspection system there are serious delays in the destruction of chemical weapons stocks.
- States and the chemical industry need also pay more attention to the **protection of facilities for the production and transport** of dangerous chemicals. There may be lessons to learn from the nuclear industry. Recent **suicide missions in Iraq** show that the simple use of trucks filled with **chlorine** can be used to cause terror and many casualties.

[NUCLEAR WEAPONS]

While the production, storing and use of biological and chemical weapons have thus been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions the same has not been achieved for **nuclear weapons**. An **advisory opinion** of the International Court of Justice concludes that **most uses would be illegal** but recognizes a limited area of legal use.

The approach taken so far is a **fragmented** one: Bans on the deployment of NW in the Antarctic, on the seabed, in space; many important bilateral US- Soviet bilateral agreements, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

The **Non Proliferation Treaty** is the central agreement. It has been – and remains – of crucial importance. It was concluded in 1968. Without it nuclear weapons might have spread to many more than the eight or nine states, which have them today. (President Kennedy's fear).

Through the **Non-Proliferation Treaty a global bargain** was sought:

- **All non-nuclear** weapon states should commit themselves not to acquire these weapons, and
- **The then five nuclear** weapon states should commit themselves to negotiate toward nuclear disarmament .

Without the commitment of the nuclear weapon states to disarmament the bargain would not have been reached and without a **confirmation** of that commitment at the review conference in 1995 the treaty would not have been prolonged.

If all the states in the world had adhered and implemented their respective commitments, we would have had to a **nuclear weapon free world**. Regrettably, we are not there! The treaty has seen both success and failure and it is today **under strain**.

First, the **successes**: no arms control treaty has attained as wide adherence as the NPT.

Of special importance is that **South Africa**, which had nuclear weapons and dismantled them, joined the treaty as a NNWS.

Of great importance was also that **Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan**, which had nuclear weapons on their territories, transferred them to Russia and joined the treaty.

Now to the **failures: India, Israel and Pakistan** never joined the treaty but acquired nuclear weapons. **North Korea** withdrew from the treaty and **Iraq, Libya and North Korea** have breached their obligations as parties to the treaty. Many fear that **Iran** is intent to do the same.

A failure of great magnitude is also that 37 years after the entry into force of the treaty and some 17 years after the end of the Cold War **the five nuclear weapon states parties**, even though reducing the number of warheads, do **not appear to take seriously their obligation to negotiate toward disarmament**. Many NNWS feel simply cheated.

The view is gathering support that in order to **prevent further proliferation**, the nuclear weapon states **need to take decisive steps toward disarmament**. The **UK and US plans** to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons is a defiance of the NPT. Their preaching non-proliferation to the world sounds hollow when they, themselves develop new weapons.

WHAT does the COMMISSION PROPOSE?

The Commission places **highest on the list of priorities** the ratifications necessary to bring into force the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996**.

A **partial test ban treaty** was concluded early during the Cold War. While it did not stop testing underground and under water it did save the world from further radioactive fallout from weapons tests.

It took the world several decades to negotiate a treaty **banning all** nuclear weapons tests and it has been an immense **disappointment** that when, at last it was achieved, the treaty was rejected by the United States Senate although it had been signed by the Clinton administration.

The WMDC **urges the US to reconsider** the treaty. Ratification by the US would in all likelihood lead to ratification by a number of other states and lead to the entry into force of the treaty, creating a strong legal barrier against any further nuclear weapons tests in the world.

If, on the other hand, the treaty were seen to **lapse**, there would be an increased **risk** that some nuclear or would-be nuclear weapon states might restart weapons tests, as we have seen North Korea do.

Second on the list of priorities, the Commission places the negotiation of the long discussed Treaty containing a **verified prohibition of the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons uses** – a cut-off treaty (FMCT). The combination of a reduction in existing nuclear weapons and a verified closing of the tap for more weapons fissile material would gradually reduce the world inventory of bombs.

The Commission recommends many other measures.

Some aim to reduce the risk of a use of nuclear weapons:

- Nuclear weapon states should review the role of their weapons in their national security **doctrines**.
- Nuclear weapon states should consider how they can **manage their future defense needs** without these weapons – as the rest of the world’s countries must do. **Reduce the range of permissible use**
- Nuclear weapon states should take all weapons **off hair trigger alert** to reduce the risk of launchings by error and misunderstandings.
- Nuclear weapon states should revert to the policy of **non first use**.

Some recommendations aim to reduce deployment and number:

- The **US and Russia**, which have by far the largest arsenals, should **take the lead** in reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons.
- US nuclear weapons should be **withdrawn from European to US territory and** Russian nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from forward deployment to central storages. With increasing cooperation between Russia and EU there is no justification for the current deployment.

Some recommendations seek to reduce the risk of further proliferation – to states and non-state actors. For instance:

- Measures to **reduce the risk of trafficking** in nuclear materials, such as enriched uranium, plutonium or radioactive substances.
- Measures to **strengthen national export controls** on nuclear equipment and materials. The ease with which **Mr. Khan** of Pakistan succeeded to export of centrifuge technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea **shocked the world** and made it understand that export controls were essential everywhere and that it was not enough to have them in the industrially advanced countries.
- **The acceptance** by individual states of the **Additional Protocol of the IAEA on safeguards inspection**, enhancing considerably the capability of the Agency to detect any undeclared nuclear activities.

Let me turn to some specific important issues: the fuel cycle, DPRK and Iran:

- First, the **fuel cycle**. It is widely expected that the use of **nuclear power will increase** in the world, as it is capable of generating vast amounts of **energy** without contributing much of the green-house gas carbon-dioxide. With more nuclear power plants more enriched uranium will be needed for nuclear fuel and with more enrichment plants **there could be a risk of plants being used not only to produce low enriched nuclear fuel but also highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons**.

- This is precisely the risk that worries the world about **IRAN**: that facilities claimed to be built for the production of low enriched nuclear fuel, may be **used to make high enriched nuclear uranium** for nuclear bombs.
 - Although the problem is **acute only as regards Iran, a number of schemes have been advanced** to tackle the issue.
 - **The US** has devised a very ambitious **project** under which **a few states would become the sole ‘fuel cycle states’**, responsible for producing all nuclear fuel and renting to other states. (A nuclear fuel OPEC?)
 - Other schemes suggest the creation of some **international institution or arrangement to give** assurances to non nuclear weapon states about the safe supply of fuel and, thereby, to persuade them to refrain from building fuel cycle facilities of their own. The **Commission** Report **suggests that** the IAEA should be the forum for further exploration of possible options regarding the fuel cycle. The questions are important but hardly burning.
-
- In the acute **case of Korea** we find that the two Korean states chose already in their Denuclearization Declaration of 1992 to commit themselves not to have fuel cycle installations on their territories. This was, no doubt, prompted by a concern that in the **sensitive Korean environment** any fuel cycle activity – even though inspected – could raise suspicions
 - It is of interest to keep this **Korean arrangement in mind** when we consider **the case of Iran and the Middle East**. Here is another sensitive region. Iran’s declared ability to enrich uranium has already created a great deal of suspicion that the country aims to make a nuclear weapon. **Tension has risen** and threats by the US and Israel have been made to attack Iran, unless the enrichment is suspended.
 - In this tense climate several states in the region, including the Gulf States, Jordan and Egypt have announced their intentions to develop nuclear power. It is not known whether these states would want to have their own facilities to enrich uranium, but it is a fact that **Israel is reprocessing spent nuclear fuel** to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.
 - For the **Middle East** there have long existed proposals for agreement on a **zone free of nuclear weapons or free of all weapons of mass destruction**. The Commission endorses these plans accepted in principle by all states in the region.
 - Agreement on such a zone would allow the **parties to include a variety of arrangements** that go beyond those contained in the Non Proliferation Treaty. They could set up **an inspection system** that combined IAEA safeguards inspection with some inspection by the parties and allowed for ‘challenge inspections’. They could include elements of direct co-operation in the nuclear field.
 - However, **devising a zone** free of WMD in the Middle East is **hardly possible until** a peace settlement is being prepared.
-
- **The Commission raises the question** whether at the current time a more modest arrangements along the lines agreed between the Korean states could be adopted for the Middle East. Like the Korean peninsula the Middle East is a particularly

sensitive region, where fuel cycle activities -- even if well inspected -- might raise suspicions.

- Would it be possible against that background **for all the states in the region** – including Iran and Israel – to commit to **a verified renunciation** of all **fuel cycle activities** – such as enrichment and reprocessing – for a prolonged period of time, while obtaining assurances about the supply of fuel needed for any civilian nuclear power.
- In such a scheme **Iran** would be **only one of several** states that for special reasons refrained from exercising their right under the NPT to enrich uranium. While **Israel's nuclear weapons** would not be affected the country would have to **forego any further reprocessing** to make weapons grade and would have to **accept international verification**.
- I mention this idea as an **illustration** of something that might or might not fly. **In the search** for solutions to knotty problems we have to **use our knowledge** and **our imagination**.
- The report of the Commission is an overview of arguments and ideas for governments, think tanks, civic society and media. They need facts and inspiration and it is high time that they become **active to revive disarmament**.