

Russia and the Chemical Disarmament Process

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RUSSIA AND THE CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT PROCESS

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SUMMARY

After the end of World War II, research and development of chemical weapons was under way intensely in many countries, including the USSR and the USA. With the refining of toxic agents, new means of their use in combat action were being developed intensely.

At the same time, scientists and world public opinion expressed increasing alarm at expanded preparations for chemical and biological war, and the continued build-up of the stocks of these weapons by the leading world powers. As a result, on September 3, 1992, the Conference on Disarmament adopted in Geneva the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).

After long debates the CWC was ratified in Russia and on December 5, 1997, it came into force in regard to our country. Russia officially declared in a timely manner that it possessed nearly 40,000 tons of toxic agents that are stored in special arsenals located in 7 storage places.

Among other provisions the CWC set certain deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons: stage 1 - not later than in three years' time no less than one per cent of chemical weapons (CW) shall have to be destroyed; stage 2 - not later than in five years' time no less than 20% of CW to be destroyed; stage 3 - not later than in seven years' time no less than 45% of CW to be destroyed; and stage 4 - not later than in 10 years' time all chemical weapons shall have to be destroyed. Hence the final term for the annihilation of the whole storage is to be the year 2007.

But after Russia encountered certain practical difficulties while implementing the first stage, it had to follow a more pessimistic assessment of its possibilities to adhere to the time schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons. Russia was compelled in 2002 to request the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to prolong the time frame for the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks by five years, thus making it April 29, 2012.

Still, important difficulties on the way of implementation of the CWC for Russia exist. A number of Russian politicians and experts consider the irregularity and the low level of Western assistance to be the principal reason for Russia's difficulties.

The most substantial funds were allocated to Russia under the Global Partnership Program adopted by the Group of Eight leading industrialized

nations in 2002. According to the assessment of V. Kholstov, deputy director of the Agency for Industry, no less than \$3 billion will be required for implementing the country's chemical disarmament programs. But up till now only \$217 million of gratuitous assistance has been received which makes up only 7% of what is required. But there are a lot of other reasons that, despite the steps being taken, allow us to speak of Russia's probable failure to meet the deadlines set for the fulfillment of the second stage of CW elimination.

There are a number of authoritative opinions that the Russian side in its turn does not do everything it possibly can, including the underfinancing (financing much lower than the budgetary allocation), for the earliest fulfillment of the second stage of CW destruction. Another problem that was raised, for example, by the Audit Chamber, is that of nonpurpose-oriented and ineffective use of funds. One more serious problem in the way of fulfilling the second stage of chemical weapons destruction is that the Federal Target Program «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation» is not realistic enough. The repeated review of the Federal Target Program can be attributed to one more important problem in the elimination of chemical weapons in Russia - a frequent reorganization of the executive authorities responsible for the fulfillment of the program. A separate issue in the implementation of the second stage of the program is a set of problems related to the technology of chemical weapons destruction.

Taking into account all these complexities, Russia may not be able to fulfill its obligations under the CWC.

To rectify the existing situation, it can be suggested to form an independent authoritative commission from among the representatives of the executive and legislative authorities, experts and scientists for an objective assessment of how realistic the present plans are for the fulfillment of the chemical weapons destruction program in Russia.

Moreover, taking into account the fact that concern has been expressed in the USA also over its possibility to meet the deadlines for the destruction of US chemical weapons stocks Russian-American consultations may be conducted on this issue. The result of such consultations may be a joint request to the OPCW to extend the time for the destruction of chemical weapons for these two countries that possess the biggest stocks of these weapons.

Introduction

Politicians, experts and public opinion often regard the problem of destruction of Russia's accumulated chemical weapons stocks as having been fundamentally resolved and not requiring close attention. One way or another, it

has been given much less priority than combat against terrorism, nuclear safety and other challenges of the new century.

Meanwhile, as the intermediate periods and the deadlines set for the elimination of these mass destruction weapons by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC) have been drawing near, a number of Russia's experts, representatives of government departments and institutions have still greater doubts about the country's real possibility to fully meet the international obligations it took upon itself.

These doubts have been due to many internal and external reasons. Among these reference has been made to the insufficient amount of foreign assistance for the destruction of chemical weapons (DCW) of Russia and the irregular provision of such assistance; the underestimation by the Russian side of the scale of the work to be done in this sphere; the huge amounts of weapons that shall be subject to elimination; the chronic budgetary underfunding of the program; organizational difficulties, to mention but a few. Despite the official statements by the Russian government structures that all of Russia's obligations provided for by the CWC will be fulfilled precisely and on time, serious concern over the feasibility of these plans still persists.

In this report the authors have made an attempt to investigate in more detail the problem of destruction of Russia's chemical weapons, draw their own conclusions and suggest some recommendations that, as they hope, will be of use to help, if not the solution, the identification of the most acute problems in the disarmament and international security sphere under review.

I. Brief historical background and the course of implementation by Russia of its CWC obligations

After the end of World War II, research and development of chemical weapons was under way intensely in many countries, including the USSR and the USA. With the refining of toxic agents, new means of their use in combat action were also being developed. During World War I, gas discharge and smoke emission, and artillery chemical ammunition (shells and mines) were all used. They were followed later on by chemical aerial bombs, pour-out aerial devices, gas mines, jet-propelled chemical munitions, missile chemical warheads, mixed destruction means (bullets, shells, mines, aerial bombs), and means with binary charges. In that period huge stocks of chemical weapons were accumulated.

At the same time, scientists and world public opinion expressed increasing alarm at expanded preparations for chemical and biological war, and the continued build-up of the stocks of these weapons by the leading world powers. The result of many years of negotiations was rapprochement between the stands

taken by the countries that possessed the major stocks of chemical weapons – the USA and the USSR.

In 1969, a special report by the United Nations Secretary-General on chemical and biological weapons and the consequences of their possible use was prepared and submitted for the consideration of the UN General Assembly. In that same year, the USSR advocated the conclusion of a convention on an end to the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on their elimination, and put forward a draft of such a convention that failed to be agreed upon after all.

In 1972, after the discussion of the problems of bacteriological weapons in the Committee on Disarmament, efforts succeeded in agreeing upon the text of the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of the stocks of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Immediately after the Convention was concluded, vigorous activities were started with a view to drawing up a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. In 1972, the USSR submitted a draft to the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, the production of V gas (the most toxic of chemical warfare agents) and munitions on its basis was launched at the Lenin Komsomol (Young Communist League) Khimprom (Chemical Industry) Research and Production Association (NPO) built especially for this purpose.

In 1976-80, bilateral Soviet-American negotiations were conducted on the prohibition of chemical weapons but were cut short mainly because of the failure of the parties to agree upon verification procedures. Much attention to the problem was given by the Conference on Disarmament and as part of the Conference an ad hoc committee was functioning on the preparation of the draft of an international convention.

In 1985, a decision was made in the USSR on the construction of the first chemical weapons destruction facility in Chapayevsk (Samara Region). The plant was built within a record short period of time (less than in two years' time) but has not been put into operation since then. This was due, on the one hand, to the authorities' disregard inherited from Soviet times for public opinion and, accordingly, the failure to inform the public of the existing plans and, on the other, an opportunity made available to the citizens, with M. Gorbachev's accession to leadership of the State, to influence the authorities' decisions. Eventually, as a result of the citizens' concern over ensuring the safety of the CW destruction process and due to an active public opposition, the facility was first 'frozen' and then retrofitted into a center for the training of specialists in the destruction of chemical weapons.

Since 1987, the production of chemical weapons has been stopped in the USSR.

In 1989, the USSR and the USA exchanged for the first time memoranda on toxic agents stocks, the location of their storage facilities and on their production facilities. The USSR declared that it possessed 40,000 tons of toxic agents.

After the disintegration of the USSR, as a result of the various kinds of regrouping of chemical arsenals, Russia inherited all chemical weapons stocks and almost all production and testing capacities of the Soviet Union. Russia came into possession of a big military-chemical scientific and production complex that comprises a network of research organizations located in several regions of the country, including Moscow.

On September 3, 1992, the Conference on Disarmament adopted in Geneva the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). On January 13, 1993, the official conclusion of this international Convention took place in Paris. The text of the Convention has been open to signature since January 13, 1993, and was signed by Russia on that same day.

After long debates that were quite heated now and then, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation ratified the CWC on October 31, 1997, and on November 5, 1997, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation approved it.

On November 5, 1997, Federal Law No. 138-FZ of the Russian Federation «On Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction» was adopted.

On December 5, 1997, the CWC came into force in regard to Russia. In conformity with the CWC requirements, Russia was to start on November 5, 1999, and to complete by April 29, 2007, the destruction of its chemical arsenals.

On October 31, 1996, the 65th instrument of ratification of the Convention was deposited with the United Nations, and on April 29, 1997, this most important international document acquired the power of the law. Since that date the countdown has begun for its implementation irrespective of when one or another State ratified the CWC.

The Convention demands that the signatory States should renounce the development, production and stockpiling of chemical warfare agents and their precursors (their immediate predecessors) except for small amounts for peaceful purposes. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

- 1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons;
- 2) to use chemical weapons;
- 3) to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;

4) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

In addition to that, each State Party undertakes not to use riot control chemical agents as a method of warfare.

In compliance with the CWC requirements, within a year after this Convention enters into force a State Party shall have to declare all chemical weapons production and storage facilities and provide access to their inspection.

The CWC provides that all the existing chemical weapons stocks shall be subject to destruction under strict international control. Such destruction shall begin not later than two years and shall finish not later than 10 years after this Convention enters into force. The chemical weapons production facilities shall also be subject to destruction.

The CWC set the following deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons (the countdown has begun since this Convention entered into force, i.e., since April 29, 1997):

Stage 1: Not later than in three years' time no less than one per cent of chemical weapons (CW) shall have to be destroyed;

Stage 2: not later than in five years' time no less than 20% of CW shall have to be destroyed;

Stage 3: not later than in seven years' time no less than 45% of CW shall have to be destroyed;

Stage 4: not later than in 10 years' time all chemical weapons shall have to be destroyed.

Should a State Party be unable to meet the deadlines set for the destruction of chemical weapons, it may request the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to prolong the time limits for another five years.

Furthermore, a State Party shall be obliged to destroy within 10 years all chemical weapons production capacities or to convert them in such a manner that «the converted facility is not more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons production facility than any other facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes» not involving chemical weapons.

According to the CWC, each State shall determine in what way it will be destroying its chemical weapons, but for this purpose it shall be prohibited to dump chemical weapons into water areas, bury them in ground or burn them in the open air. At the same time, each State «shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment» in accordance with its national sanitary standards. The destruction of chemical weapons shall have to be carried out at special facilities that, because of their possible harmful impact on nature and humans, are referred to as especially dangerous and should be so far away from inhabited localities and other facilities as to prevent any

adverse effect on the population and the environment either when such a special facility functions without a hitch or in case of an accident there.

When dealing with the task of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons that is quite topical for the world community, the CWC provides for creating such conditions at the international level when the possession of chemical weapons becomes unnecessary and inexpedient. This is to be ensured, above all, through a verification system that is to cover nearly 20,000 chemical facilities located in all areas of the world. Apart from political and economic sanctions that may be applied against the violators of the CWC, military measures may also be used following the decision made by the UN Security Council.

The CWC also provides that each State Party shall have to elaborate and put into effect its national plan for meeting its obligations in regard to the fulfillment of the Convention's requirements, a schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons and their production and storage facilities, and a system of legislative acts that shall define the CWC-prohibited activity as unlawful and envisage serious responsibility for being engaged in such activity.

Having acceded to the CWC and ratified it, Russia demonstrated the political will and the resolve to get rid of chemical weapons forever. Evidence of this is, at least, the circumstance that immediately after signing the CWC political and practical steps were taken to make preparations for its fulfillment. Many of the CWC requirements began to be implemented in Russia prior to the ratification of the Convention. Since 1993, work has been started to select safe and economically acceptable technologies for chemical weapons destruction, to design facilities for the destruction of skin irritants stocks stored in the territory of the Saratov Region and the Udmurt Republic, and to draw up a standard-legislative framework and a government program for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks in Russia.

On March 24, 1995, Decree No. 314 by the President of the Russian Federation «On Preparations of the Russian Federation for Fulfillment of International Obligations in the Sphere of Chemical Disarmament» was issued.

On March 21, 1996, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 305 «On Approving the Federal Target Program 'Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation'». The Program clearly defined priorities: the absolute fulfillment of international obligations in regard to the elimination of chemical weapons stocks, an environmental improvement in the regions of their storage and efforts to relieve the population in these regions of socio-psychological tension, and the priority development of the social infrastructure; ensuring the safety of the chemical weapons destruction process and environment protection; and ensuring the economic acceptability of the disarmament process. The Program was projected to be fulfilled in the period from 1995 through 2007, with the total expenses of 16.6 trillion rubles (in prices as of January 1, 1995) and 500 million dollars for international control purposes.

On April 13, 1996, Decree No. 542 by the Russian President «On Granting the Federal Target Program ‘Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation’ Presidential Program Status» was issued.

On May 2, 1997, Federal Law No. 76-FZ of the Russian Federation «On Destruction of Chemical Weapons» was adopted.

Russia officially declared in a timely manner that it possessed nearly 40,000 tons of toxic agents that are stored in special arsenals located in the Udmurt Republic (Kambarka and Kizner) and in the Bryansk (Pochev), Kirov (Maradykovsky), Kurgan (Shchuchye), Penza (Leonidovka) and Saratov (Gorny) regions, and produced a list of the toxic agents as follows:

- 690 tons of mustard gas;
- 7 355 tons of lewisite;
- 214.3 tons of mustard gas and lewisite mixture;
- 5 tons of phosgene;
- 11 700 tons of sarin;
- 4 800 tons of soman;
- 15 200 tons of V gas.

At the same time, when making a correct and well-considered political decision on the elimination of its chemical arsenal, Russia was not ready at that moment to ensure the process of its complete destruction at the expense of its own resources. Aware of this, many of the countries that ratified the Convention promised to support Russia financially.

With its experts needed to tackle the task and a sufficiently developed scientific and technological basis for the destruction of chemical weapons, Russia that was in a most difficult economic situation in the 1990s was then obviously short of financial resources. Government financing for the destruction of chemical weapons in 1996-99 made up a mere 3.1% of what was needed. Such an amount of budgetary financing for the Federal Target Program «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation» (FTP-DCWS) in that period was absolutely insufficient for carrying out work on the construction of special facilities for chemical weapons destruction and of the needed production infrastructure both of which shall have to meet the Convention’s requirements, for solving quite a few social problems that inevitably arise in the process, and for making payments to international inspections.

This concerned mainly the biggest capital-intensive part of Russia’s international obligations in regard to the CWC, that is, the destruction of category 1 chemical weapons (which means chemical munitions filled with toxic agents, and toxic agents kept in containers and intended for the filling of ammunition). Much less expensive work on the destruction of categories 2 and 3 chemical weapons was carried on virtually according to the original schedule, so were various logistics measures.

The new wording of the FTP-DCWS, adopted in accordance with Resolution No. 510, dated July 5, 2001, of the Government of the Russian Federation «On Making Changes and Amendments to Resolution No. 305, dated March 21, 1996, of the Government of the Russian Federation 'On Approving the Federal Target Program 'Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation'» projected the completion of destruction of categories 2 and 3 chemical weapons within the time frame set by the CWC (before April 29, 2002), as well as the conversion or destruction of the former chemical weapons production facilities (before April 29, 2003, and April 29, 2007, respectively), and also included a number of new provisions as follows:

- more precise specification of the time frame for category 1 chemical weapons destruction that is planned to be carried out according to the following schedule:

Stage 1: 1% of stocks – in 2003;

Stage 2: 20% of stocks – in 2007;

Stage 3: 45% of stocks – in 2008¹;

Stage 4: 100% of stocks – before April 29, 2012.

After completing work on the destruction of category 1 chemical weapons, projects will be launched to put the chemical weapons destruction facilities out of operation, to improve the polluted areas, and destroy or convert the chemical weapons destruction facilities into facilities to be all used for general industrial purposes. These projects are not tied to the deadlines for the fulfillment of the obligations provided for by the CWC and are not included in the list of major measures under the FTP-DCWS.

Following a more realistic and responsible assessment of its possibilities to adhere to the time for the destruction of chemical weapons, Russia was compelled in 2002 to request the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to prolong the time frame for the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks for five years. In November 2003, at the Eighth session of the Conference of States-Parties to the Convention, Russia was granted a postponement in regard to the three last stages of the destruction of chemical weapons. As a result, the deadline for the final destruction of chemical weapons in Russia was put off to April 29, 2012.

Russia fulfilled in due course its obligations of the first stage of the destruction of category 1 chemical weapons. In 2001-2002, category 2 chemical weapons (munitions with phosgene charges) and category 3 chemical weapons (munitions and devices without filling, and equipment specially intended for the use of chemical weapons) were also destroyed. During the operation of the chemical weapons destruction facility in the township of Gorny in the Saratov region (the facility was started on December 19, 2002) it became evident that the adopted technologies can be considered to be safe ecologically, as well as reliable and optimal as for their economic indicators.

In Russia, a national legislative framework has been created for the chemical disarmament process and a mechanism has been tried and tested for exercising international control and inspections by the OPCW at Russia's chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities.

This does not remove, however, many of the existing problems facing Russia. At the subsequent stages of the implementation of the CWC, Russia will still have to do a good deal of work to fulfill the international obligations it assumed in the sphere of chemical disarmament.

Until recently, especially during the implementation of the first stage of the destruction of chemical weapons, the financing of these programs from the Federal budget was both insufficient and irregular. Therefore, much attention in that period of time was turned toward foreign assistance. Unfortunately, in several cases some Russian officials and experts tried to explain all the imperfections in the fulfillment of the Russian chemical weapons destruction program by the insufficiency and the organizational problems in the delivery of foreign assistance to Russia.

II. Foreign assistance

Given the enormous amount of work to be done to eliminate chemical weapons, when Russia signed and ratified the CWC the country was given unequivocal guarantees that it will be provided considerable assistance in the destruction of its chemical weapons by the world community – primarily by the Group of Eight leading industrialized nations. The obligations of Russian partners in regard to these problems were repeatedly confirmed, and an appropriate assistance was provided. However, till now it has been impossible to raise the question about an early and long-range planning of such assistance to be given. As a result, Russia has problems in drawing up its budgetary plans, and this kind of assistance comes very irregularly.

What is more, in previous years only a part of allocated funds came, as a rule, to Russian recipients. In accordance with the system adopted in the West for providing assistance to foreign countries, the allocated funds are usually distributed through the national contractors of a donor country. The contractors produce equipment supplied to a recipient country, where the equipment is used to achieve the tasks that have been set and, in the case of Russia, for the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities (CWDF) in the country and the establishment of an appropriate infrastructure there. A part of the allocated funds goes to concomitant purposes such as the assessment of a recipient country's requirements for assistance in one or another program, management in the implementation of the assistance program, and audit as to whether the funds have been spent properly. Naturally, the personnel of a donor country perform these functions.

In general, according to a number of experts, it is up to 30% of the allocated funds that go only towards servicing such assistance. In other words, in the opinion of some Russian experts, the governments of the donor countries seek to spend funds given for providing assistance in such a manner as to ensure the highest incomes for their own producers and personnel.

Russia, in its turn, is interested in quite the opposite because for the fulfilment of the relevant tasks it needs not only equipment but also mainly cash. Russia began to feel a special need for cash resources after it started to implement its Federal Target Program in its second wording adopted in 2001.

Moscow has repeatedly pointed to this circumstance, and this, it would seem, met with certain understanding among donor countries. New hopes for a change in the situation were linked to the Global Partnership Program adopted by the Group of Eight leading industrialized nations in 2002, as a result of which the donor countries reconfirmed their readiness to allocate quite substantial funds to Russia for the destruction of its chemical weapons.

Thus, according to the data given in the report of the US General Accounting Office (GAO) that was published in March 2004, as of December 2003, international donors, primarily the USA and Germany, and other countries (the European Union, Canada, Italy, Great Britain, Switzerland, Norway and Czech Republic) allocated \$585 million and committed themselves to give more than \$1.7 billion for the further destruction of chemical weapons (CW) in Russia².

However, the Russian side has declared that the figures given above represent largely a declaration of intent, especially in regard to the real financing of Russia's chemical weapons destruction programs. The real assistance, however, as Russian politicians and experts like to emphasise, by the world community is quite modest.

It will be recalled that *the United States* that is the main donor country agreed to finance the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuchye (Kurgan region). As part of the program of joint threat reduction, the US Department of Defense took upon itself a financial obligation worth more than \$460 million to go toward the planning, development and construction of the facility. In October 2003, the US Department of Defense announced the estimates of expenditures and the schedule of completing work in Shchuchye. According to the estimates, the volume of expenditures is to grow by 2006 to nearly \$888 million³. However, as of the end of 2004, according to the data given by N. Bezborodov, a member of the State Commission for Chemical Disarmament, only \$124.9 million⁴ in cash came from the USA to Russia.

Italy was suggested by the Government of Russia to participate in the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in the town of Pochep (Bryansk region). After long negotiations, an intergovernmental agreement was

signed on allocating 360 million euros within five years (from 2004 through 2008) for assistance to Russia in its chemical disarmament. Somewhat earlier, Italy made a decision on increasing the amount of its assistance and helping build an engineering infrastructure for the facility in Shchuchye from \$6.9 million to \$7.3 million, which were made available to Russia⁵.

The above-mentioned USGAO report makes clear that Russia can rely on substantial assistance from *the FRG* in the destruction of skin irritant chemical weapons stocks at facilities in Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) and Gorny (Saratov region). There was a peculiar division of labor — Russia constructed buildings for the chemical weapons destruction facilities, while Germany was supplying equipment on which nearly \$58 million were spent from 1993 through 2003. The FRG committed itself to invest \$120 million in the construction of the CWDF in Kambarka and allocate an additional \$300 million⁶.

Canada was suggested by the Government of Russia to get involved in the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) in the township of Leonidovka (Penza region), with expenses on the project amounting to 330 million euros. Canada has not yet made a decision on the matter. From 2000 through 2001, Canada allocated \$161,000 for the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia but it actually gave \$47,300. At the present time, Canada allocated an additional \$20 million for building the engineering infrastructure of the facility in Shchuchye and for modernizing the physical protection system of the chemical waste storage facility in Leonidovka⁷.

Great Britain was suggested by the Government of Russia to render assistance in the construction of a CWDF in the township of Maradykovsky (Kirov region), with expenses on the project amounting to 380 million euros. Great Britain has not yet given its consent. However, as part of the 2001 intergovernmental agreement that is in force, under which 12 million pounds sterling were allocated for Russia, an understanding was reached about the allocation of a further \$10 million for building the engineering infrastructure of the facility in Shchuchye. Under that same agreement, Norway that promised in the past to give \$878,000 to Russia without specifying the exact time for that matter now plans to allocate \$2 million for the purchase of equipment for the electric power plant in Shchuchye⁸.

The European Union was suggested by Russia to participate together with Great Britain in the construction of a CWDF in the township of Maradykovsky. So far no interest has been shown in the suggestion. Earlier, the European Union provided assistance in the construction of the CWDF in Gorny (by giving 5.8 billion euros) and participated in Russia's projects for setting up environment monitoring systems in Gorny and converting the chemical weapons production facility in the town of Dzershinsk (by giving nearly \$4 million). At the present time, an understanding has been reached about the European Union's accession to the agreement between Russia and Great Britain and about 2.3 million euros

to be given by the European Union for building the engineering infrastructure in Shchuchye⁹.

France and Russia do not have agreements in force in the sphere of global partnership. At negotiations, French representatives speak of 10 million euros that will possibly be given for improving the environment monitoring system in the township of Gorny and ensuring the safe storage of CW in Kizner. However, so far there are no official documents that would formalize this understanding.

Japan, despite commitments it made, has not yet participated in work on chemical disarmament in Russia.

The Netherlands promised in 2003 to allocate 11.4 million euros for assistance in the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Kambarka, but so far nothing has been given.

Switzerland allocated 15 million Swiss francs (on a six years' installment plan) for the construction of facilities in Shchuchye, but so far it has not started to give anything.

The only countries that fulfilled their obligations to provide assistance to Russia in its chemical disarmament were *Finland* and *Sweden*. Russia was fully paid \$830,000 and \$390,000 they had promised, respectively¹⁰.

The data given above make it evident that Russia's expectations of receiving financial assistance to be adequate to the goals set in the chemical disarmament sphere have obviously not been met.

As is known, when implementing its plans for the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities, Russia signed 28 international intergovernmental agreements. This would enable it to expect within the next five years, according to the most conservative estimates, \$1,346 million to come from without. However, according to a number of statements by Russian officials, Russia actually received in 2002 – \$14 million, in 2003 – nearly \$60 million and, finally, in 2004 – only \$216.3 million¹¹. Moreover, in the opinion of A. Kharichev, a member of the State Commission of Russia for Chemical Disarmament, «in fact, 80% of the funds allocated for chemical disarmament are Russia's budgetary money, while the countries that promised assistance to Russia give not more than 20%»¹².

V. Kholstov, deputy director of the Agency for Industry, was still more critical in his assessment of foreign gratuitous assistance. He said in particular that no less than \$3 billion would be required for implementing the country's chemical disarmament programs. As a result, in his opinion, nearly \$217 million worth of gratuitous assistance that has been received makes up only 7% of what is required¹³. The reference book «Global Partnership Against Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons» estimates the same sum at \$217 million that was supposedly received by Russia from all donor countries as of the end of 2004, and as accounting for «less than 5% of the cost of the chemical weapons destruction program»¹⁴. The thing to note here is that it is not quite clear how the

figure of between \$216 million and \$217 million in foreign assistance during the entire period of its provision emerged. The figure was called for the first time in mid-2004, but as of mid-2005, the same figure pronounced now and then by the Russian side remains invariable. The only thing that changed is the time frame within which the sum was supposedly received. At first, it meant the situation as of the start of 2004; there is now talk of the end of that same year. In other words, if the suggested calculations are to be adhered to, it turns out that such assistance was not provided at all during 2004.

There is a still more pessimistic assessment of the insufficient provision of foreign assistance in the sphere of chemical disarmament in Russia. In the opinion of Professor N. Kalinina, \$3 billion (30 billion rubles and 1.5 billion euros) will be needed only for the construction of four chemical weapons destruction facilities (Kambarka, Maradykovsky, Leonidovka, and Pochep). These calculations do not include either US expenses on the construction of the facility in Shchuchye or chemical weapons transportation costs¹⁵.

In the opinion of Russian experts, expenses, should foreign companies get involved in the construction and operation of facilities, may increase by nearly three times because of the difference in payments for the services rendered by Russian and foreign contractors. Finally, the problem is also that assistance from foreign partners is provided on an annual basis, which makes it hard to put such assistance to good use.

The donor countries, in their turn, put forward many claims on the Russian side. Thus, Russia is accused of providing insufficient information on its chemical weapons stocks, of not giving Western experts permission to visit the facilities to which assistance has been given, of bureaucratic procrastination at negotiations on providing assistance, and, most importantly, of lack of comprehensive data on how the allocated funds are spent. In this context, concern has been expressed over the fact that the allocated funds can be embezzled or spent on purposes that do not meet the interests of the donor countries.

The present situation is arousing ever growing concern over the fulfillment of the Federal Target Program (FTP) whose real financing, as estimated by N. Bezborodov, a member of the State Commission for Disarmament accounted in 2002-2004 for only about 62% of the projected amounts of monetary funds¹⁶. As a result, putting the projected facilities into service is behind schedule, and this, in its turn, undermines confidence in the fulfillment by Russia of the obligations it took upon itself in regard to the second stage of chemical disarmament under the CWC¹⁷. In the opinion of N. Kalinina, «in case of lack of cardinal changes in the sphere of practical foreign assistance in the implementation of Russia's chemical disarmament program, another postponement of the time frame for the implementation of this program is not to be excluded»¹⁸. In other words, there is a danger now that the deadlines

set by the Convention for the fulfillment of the chemical weapons destruction process will not be met.

III. The main problems and specifics of the second stage of CW stocks destruction in Russia

Under the original plans of the leadership of Russia, the second stage of chemical weapons elimination was projected to start in 2000 and to be completed by April 29, 2002. However, only in the end of 2002 started the practical destruction of CW in Russia. According to the CWC provisions, the Russian Federation could avail itself of its right to prolong the time frame for five years. At the Eighth conference of the States-Parties to the CWC that was over in early November 2003, the prolongation of the deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons was approved for the USA, South Korea and Russia. At the conference, the definite and reviewed date for the destruction of 20% of Russia's stocks (8,000 tons out of 40,000 tons) was also finalized – April 29, 2007. This corresponds to the time provided for by the Federal Target Program «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation».

As of the end of April 2005, 863.6 tons of toxic agents were destroyed in the township of Gorny (Saratov region) at the facility functioning there. These included all mustard gas stocks that were stationed there – 622.3 tons, and lewisite stocks – 241.3 tons. In 2005, all chemical weapons stocks that are stored at this facility (1,143 tons) will be fully eliminated.

By the end of the second stage of chemical disarmament, it is planned to fully complete all work on the conversion and/or destruction of the former chemical weapons production facilities and on the elimination of the outcomes of their operation. The Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC) declared 24 former CW production facilities that shall be subject either to complete destruction or conversion into permitted types of activities. It is provided that 8 facilities shall be subject to physical destruction. Of them 7 facilities have been destroyed by now, while one facility shall have to be destroyed before April 29, 2007. Sixteen of the declared facilities are to be converted into the output of civilian products¹⁹.

In accordance with the second wording of the Federal Target Program «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation» (FTP-DCWS), at this stage in Russia, in addition to the already operating full-scale facility for chemical weapons destruction (CWD) in the Saratov region, it was projected to build another five facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons. It was also planned to complete the construction of two comprehensive chemical weapons destruction facilities in the town of Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) and in the town of Shchuchye (Kurgan region), as well as three small-scale facilities²⁰ in the town of Pochev (Bryansk region), in the township of

Leonidovka (Penza region) and in the township of Maradykovsky (Kirov region), and to put them all into operation. At the same time, work was projected for preventive purposes on setting up a social infrastructure in the regions of chemical weapons storage and destruction.

But these plans proved unrealistic, and it is provided, therefore, in the Program's third wording that is now being prepared for approval that Russia's obligations in regard to the second stage will be fulfilled with the use of only three facilities for CW destruction – Gorny, Kambarka and Maradykovsky.

In 2005, it was intended to complete the construction of a facility in the town of Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) for the destruction of lewisite stocks stationed there. It is planned to destroy there slightly more than 3,000 tons by April 29, 2007. Besides, it is planned to complete in the township of Maradykovsky (Kirov region) by the end of 2005 the construction of a facility where it will be provided for the detoxification of the toxic agents filling of munitions. The detoxification of nearly 4,300 tons of VX gases will be carried out there by April 29, 2007. Consequently, the entire amount of chemical weapons to be destroyed by April 2007 is to reach more than 8,000 tons.

Despite the steps being taken, there are reasons, however, to speak of Russia's probable failure to meet the deadlines set for the fulfillment of the second stage of CW elimination because there are many serious problems that Russia will have to solve in order to fulfill its obligations.

The first problem consists in the irregular character and the insufficient amount of funds allocated under the program, and this concerns not only funds that come from abroad (as has been shown in the previous section) but also Russia's own budgetary funds.

As has been stated above, the US side has caused delays in the financing of the programs due to lack of design information and the nontransparent regime of spending funds by the leadership of Russia. In this context, we would like to draw attention to the report «On the Malfunctioning of the State Commission for Chemical Disarmament Under the Guidance of Sergei Kiriyyenko» of June 30, 2004, made by the leaders of a number of ecological organizations. The authors of the report note that well-grounded claims have been made on the State Commission and its Chairman Sergei Kiriyyenko for the nontransparency of spending funds allocated for ensuring chemical disarmament, and this causes a constant reduction in financial assistance from Western countries²¹.

There is also an opinion that the Russian side as a whole does not do everything possible it can for the earliest fulfillment of the second stage of CW destruction. Thus, for example, on July 16, 2004, V. Ozerov, chairman of the Federation Council's Committee for Defense and Security, prepared a parliamentary interpellation to the Chairman of the Government of Russia concerning the problem «On the Course of Implementation of the Federal Target Program for Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in Russia». In doing so,

V. Ozerov stated, «at the present time less than 50% of budgetary funds of those provided for by the Federal Target Program have been allocated for the implementation of measures for the destruction of chemical weapons. This has led to exceeding the scheduled time for the fulfillment of the program by more than four years, and, this, in its turn, will not allow our country to destroy by 2007 the declared 8,000 tons of toxic agents, which account for 20% of the total chemical weapons stocks. This is the main reason why I have prepared a parliamentary interpellation addressed to the Chairman of the Government of Russia».²²

It is only starting with 2005 that the leadership of Russia deemed it possible, at long last, to review its plans for financing the destruction of chemical weapons. In 2005, in the country's draft budget adopted in the first reading 11,116 million rubles were envisaged for the national program of chemical weapons destruction. In 2004, only 5,300 million rubles were stipulated for the program, that is, two times less.

The Board of the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation considered at its session under the chairmanship of Sergei Stepashin on November 26, 2004, the results of the verification of the lawfulness and intended use of the Federal budget funds allocated in 2003 for the destruction of chemical weapons, including the fulfillment of international agreements. The underfinancing of the FTP «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation» is noted in the material collected by the Chamber. Thus, the financing of the program in 2003 was to amount to 14.98 billion rubles, but actually 6.77 billion rubles were allocated for its implementation, or 45.2% of what was needed. On the whole, according to the assessments of experts, the cumulative effect of the underfinancing of Russia's chemical weapons destruction program as of the end of 2004 was estimated at nearly \$1 billion.²³

Another problem that was raised by the Audit Chamber is that of nonpurpose-oriented and ineffective use of funds. The verification showed that the Economic Development and Trade Ministry of Russia had not made an adequate analysis of the validity of proposals by the Russian Munitions Agency (Rosboyepripany) for drafting the State defense order (Gosoboronzakaz) for 2003. As a result, capital investments were included in the GOZ for 2003 without the time for the performance of work and the supply of equipment having been agreed upon. Thus, equipment worth a total of 98.4 million rubles was supplied, which was kept at storage facilities till mid-2004. For the same reason, the assignments of the State defense order were cancelled for 13 R & D projects, though the result of their fulfilment had not been found to be negative. In the period from 2001 through 2003, 41.1 million rubles' worth of Federal budget funds were spent on the fulfillment of the above-mentioned work. It was also noted at the session of the Board of the Audit Chamber that inadequate control by the Economic Development Ministry and the Russian Munitions

Agency over the spending of the Federal budget funds allocated for the destruction of chemical weapons had cost 13.7 million rubles' of their nonpurpose-oriented use and 49.1 million rubles' worth of their ineffective use.²⁴

Another serious problem in the way of fulfilling the second stage of chemical weapons destruction is that the Federal Target Program «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation» is not realistic enough. In the program's second wording adopted in July 2001, it was intended that the chemical weapons stored at the facility in the town of Kizner (Udmurt Republic) would be transported to the town of Shchuchye (Kurgan region) and destroyed there. However, in July 2004, Sergei Kiriyenko said that the Munitions Agency had made an analysis of transportation costs and it turned out that a safe transportation of CW appears to be more expensive than the construction of a facility in its own right in Kizner. Therefore, it took three years to clear up CW transportation costs. On the basis of the report prepared by the Economic Development Ministry, the Government of the Russian Federation took decision No. Azh-P7-1631 dated April 11, 2005, on extending the time for drawing up a draft concerning a more precisely defined Federal Target program «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation» till May 8, 2005.²⁵ However, as of the start of June 2005, a new, this time a third wording of the FTP was not yet adopted.

Possibly, the repeated review of the Federal Target Program can be attributed to a third important problem in the elimination of chemical weapons in Russia - a frequent reorganization of the executive authorities responsible for the fulfillment of the program.

In accordance with Resolution No. 190, dated April 8, 2004, of the Government, the functions of the Russian Munitions Agency were transferred to the Federal Agency for Industry. The Government adopted Resolution No. 285, dated June 16, 2004, approving the Rules and Regulations of the Federal Agency for Industry (FAP). Therefore, the FAP became then the National agency to ensure the implementation of the chemical disarmament policy to be pursued by the State. The date set for the liquidation of Russian Munitions Agency was to be before June 1, 2004. However, the liquidation commission did not submit the appropriate documents by that date and the liquidation was extended till September 1, 2004, and then the date was again postponed to December 11, 2004. Besides, it is only in October of that same year that the Federal Agency for Industry was appointed the government customer (instead of the Russian Munitions Agency) of the FTP «Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stocks in the Russian Federation».

A separate problem that is a fourth one in the implementation of the second stage of the program is a set of problems related to the technology of chemical weapons destruction. Among other things, Russia has not even made

serious attempts to assert its right to taking out to chemical industry plants and processing there the reacting stock that forms as a result of the first stage of the detoxification of chemical weapons, and will have to destroy the stock by means of bituminizing or burning at facilities for the destruction of toxic agents. In other words, the detoxification of toxic agents and the formation, as its result, of reacting stock has not been recognized as the final destruction of chemical weapons. At the same time, Russia, as it appears, did not make efforts sufficient enough to get a single-stage method to be established under the Convention, and consequently it will have to incur additional expenses on the destruction of the reacting stock.

All these bring us to the conclusion that Russia will not be able to fulfill its obligations under the CWC both: from the point of Stage 2 time-table as well as from the point of the final date of complete destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile. Even if Russia will be able to meet the deadlines for the fulfillment of the second (and the following) stage of chemical weapons destruction, formally these weapons will not be fully eliminated. It is only the first stage of elimination that will be carried out – the detoxification of toxic agents that is accompanied by the formation of a great amount of reacting stock. The reacting stock itself can be destroyed (or processed) within a much longer period of time than that provided for by the Convention.

IV. The scale and character of work in the regions of Russia's CW storage and destruction

The main measures and most important problems of the second stage of chemical disarmament at the level of the regions of chemical weapons storage and destruction come down to several items, including the construction and starting-up of chemical weapons destruction facilities, the setting up of an appropriate infrastructure, including the approval of protective measures zones, the building of facilities of social importance, to mention a few.

Saratov region, the township of Gorny

As is known, the facility for chemical weapons destruction has been operating in the township of Gorny since December 19, 2002. In December 2003, all mustard gas stocks (622.3 tons) were eliminated there. Since November 26, 2003, the process of detoxification of lewisite has been started at the facility.

On April 22, 2004, another important step in chemical disarmament was made at the plant in the township of Gorny: an installation (block No. 33) for the thermal detoxification of waste was started. The installation is an example of the successful combination of domestically produced equipment and German equipment. The experience of the manufacture and assembly of equipment for

the thermal detoxification of waste, and of its operation in Gornyy will be used at other facilities that are being built in our country under the FTP-DCWS.

It is planned to completely destroy in Gornyy its arsenal stocks that make up 1,160 metric tons of mustard gas, lewisite and their mixtures (or 2.9% of all CW stocks in Russia) by 2005. In this way, at the second stage of chemical disarmament it is intended to eliminate there 1.9% out of 20% of CW stocks that are planned to be destroyed.

The estimated cost of the facility is slightly more than 7 billion rubles (over \$233 million)²⁶. The facility's capacity is 390 tons of toxic agents a year.

Kurgan region, the town of Shchuchye

In the town of Shchuchye (Kurgan region), the chemical ammunition of cannon and rocket-launching artillery and missile warheads filled with organophosphorus convulsant gases (VX gases, sarin, and soman), and with lewisite are stored there. The total weight of the toxic agents is 5,456 tons, which accounts for 13.6% of the total chemical weapons stocks in Russia.

The construction of a facility for the destruction of chemical weapons started in Shchuchye in June 2001. Work on the further development of the industrial zone at the facility has been in progress at a scale sufficient enough and equally intense. However, the originally scheduled deadlines for putting the plant into operation (2005) have been reviewed now: it is planned to complete the construction in 2007 and to start the facility in 2008. The chemical weapons destruction process will last at the facility till 2011-2012, while the amount of the toxic agents to be destroyed there will be 13.6% of the total CW stocks in Russia.

The estimated cost of the facility is 15.5 billion rubles²⁷ (over \$516 million). The USA committed itself to invest a bigger part of funds in the construction of the facility in Shchuchye. The facility's capacity is 1,900 tons of toxic agents a year.

Udmurt Republic, the town of Kambarka

The construction of a facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in Kambarka takes an important, or even determinant, place in the implementation of the second stage of chemical disarmament. The facility is planned to start to operate in 2006. As much as 6,349 tons of lewisite (skin irritants) are stored in tanks there, which accounts for nearly 15.9% of all chemical weapons stocks in Russia. This arsenal is planned to be destroyed within 3.5 years²⁸.

The estimated cost of the facility in Kambarka is nearly 7 billion rubles (over \$233 million). The facility's capacity is 2,500 tons of toxic agents a year.

Udmurt Republic, the town of Kizner

It was intended originally (under the FTP-DCWS that is currently in force) that the chemical weapons stocks in Kizner would be transported to the facility in the town of Shchuchye (Kurgan region) and destroyed there. But, as has been stated above, as a result of calculations it became clear that such

transportation (with all safety norms and rules to be observed) will cost slightly more than the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Kizner, let alone a possible growth of social tension while attempting to transport chemical weapons outside the Udmurt Republic.

The starting-up of the plant for the destruction of 5,745 tons of CW in terms of toxic agents by weight, which are stored in Kizner and account for 14.2% of the total chemical weapons stocks in Russia, is planned for 2009. The facility's capacity is 1,900 tons of toxic agents a year.

As for the construction of three other facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons: *in the Bryansk, Penza and Kirov regions*, the point to be noted here, above all, is as follows. In accordance with the currently effective second wording of the FTP-DCWS in Russia, it was planned to start the construction of the three above-mentioned facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons in 2004, to put them into operation in 2006, and to finish their operation in 2011. However, a new, third wording of the FTP-DCWS is expected to come into force within 2005, where some changes are being provided for in the time frame for the construction of the three above-mentioned CW destruction facilities.

Bryansk region, the town of Pochep

In the town of Pochep (Bryansk region) at the Dolina arsenal, air-delivered munitions filled with organophosphorus convulsant gases (VX gases, sarin, and soman), weighing a total of 7,498 tons of toxic agents, which account for 18.8% of the total chemical weapons stocks in Russia, are stored there.

In accordance with the FTP-DCWS' new wording under discussion now, the starting-up of the facility in Pochep is to be postponed to 2008, that is, to the third stage of chemical weapons destruction, and the end of the facility's operation - to 2012²⁹. Design and survey work is being done now. There is yet no approved design as a whole.

The estimated cost³⁰ of the facility is nearly 10 billion rubles (over \$333 million). The facility's capacity is 2,000 tons of toxic agents a year.

Penza region, the township of Leonidovka

In the township of Leonidovka (Penza region), air-delivered munitions filled with organophosphorus convulsant gases (VX gases, sarin, and soman), weighing a total of 6,885 tons of toxic agents, which account for 17.2% of the total chemical weapons stocks in Russia, are stored there.

The construction of a CW destruction facility is expected to start before long. However, the feasibility study (TYeO) of the project has not yet been approved. The facility is planned to be put into operation in 2008.

The estimated cost of building the facility is more than 7.5 billion rubles (\$250 million). The facility's capacity is 2,000 tons of toxic agents a year.

Kirov region, the township of Maradykovsky

In the township of Maradykovsky (Kirov region), air-delivered munitions filled with organophosphorus convulsant gases (VX gases, sarin, and soman), weighing a total of 6,890 tons of toxic agents, which account for 17.4% of the total chemical weapons stocks in Russia, are also stored there.

In accordance with the draft of the new wording of the FTP-DCWS, a facility for chemical weapons destruction is to be built in Maradykovsky before 2006. Work on chemical weapons destruction is intended to be performed there at two stages: first VX gas stocks are to be destroyed (till now such stocks have never been destroyed anywhere in our country) and then the rest of chemical weapons are to be destroyed³¹. Moreover, the destruction of toxic agents with VX charges is projected to be carried out right within aircraft projectile bodies. Under the CWC, Russia shall have to destroy 8,000 tons of toxic agents by April 29, 2007, and more than half of this amount is stored in the township of Maradykovsky³².

The estimated cost of building the facility is slightly more than 7 billion rubles (over \$233 million). The capacity of the facility's first stage is 4,300 tons of toxic agents a year and that of the second stage is 1,200 tons of toxic agents a year.

Thus, the originally scheduled deadlines for starting chemical weapons destruction facilities have not been met for various financial, organizational and managerial reasons. However, it is still possible to fulfill the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and to this end it will take efforts to be stepped up strongly along all lines of activity and at all levels of administration and management.

As has been stated above, the fulfillment of the second stage of Russia's obligations in regard to the Convention is to be ensured by the destruction of nearly 4,300 tons of toxic agents right within the bodies of large-sized air-delivered munitions at the facility in the township of Maradykovsky (Kirov region), 760 tons of toxic agents in the township of Gorny (Saratov region), and more than 3,000 tons are projected for destruction at the facility in the town of Kambarka (Udmurt Republic).

The launching of large-scale work on the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia has necessitated the solution of quite a few complicated problems of not only a technical but also medical, ecological and social character. This called for the development of a set of measures for the social protection of the citizens who are involved directly or indirectly in the chemical disarmament process, and for the solution of environmental safety problems.

Under the Federal Law of Russia «On Destruction of Chemical Weapons», the social problems of the population who live in protective measures zones (PMZ)³³ should be resolved in a priority manner, that is, before putting the given plants into operation. That means the construction of an

infrastructure needed for creating decent living conditions, including, among other things, post offices, kindergartens and medical establishments on which, as is known, 10% of all the funds allocated for the chemical weapons destruction program are to be spent³⁴.

At the present time, virtually in each region housing construction has been carried on, and upon completing the building of houses they are transferred to the jurisdiction of municipal authorities, schools and hospitals are being built or reconstructed, roads and bridges, sewage purification works, gas lines and other engineering structures are also under construction for double use, that is, intended for a chemical weapons destruction facility and the population. District consultation and diagnostic centers are being set up for the medical examination of the citizens who live and work in protective measures zones.

At the same time, in this field, too, there are obvious problems related both to meeting the deadlines for putting the appropriate facilities into service, and to the quality and scale of the work being done on the further development of the social sphere.

Conclusion

The second stage of implementing the chemical weapons destruction program in Russia is one of the most labor-intensive efforts. Moreover, it largely determines the efficiency and, essentially, the very possibility of fulfillment by Russia of its international obligations in regard to the CWC.

The originally scheduled deadlines for starting most of Russia's facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons have not been met. Though it is still possible to remain within the framework of the Convention's legal provisions, it is important to keep in mind that the potential of all manner of postponements and delays in starting chemical weapons destruction facilities for 2005 has already been exhausted.

On the whole, at the second stage of the chemical weapons destruction process, chemical disarmament dynamics is to grow drastically. It is imperative to start two chemical weapons destruction facilities in the town of Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) and in the township of Maradykovsky (Kirov region); to continue the construction of the plant in the town of Shchuchye (Kurgan region), and to start the construction of plants in the town of Pochep (Bryansk region) and in the township of Leonidovka (Penza region). There is also need to complete the development of the feasibility study and start the construction of the facility in the town of Kizner (Udmurt Republic).

The work that is being projected or already being done on the construction of social and engineering infrastructure facilities has been on a scale sufficient enough. A slowdown in their development rates may arouse a growth of social tension and lead to negative changes in the social and political situation in the

given regions. All of this calls for not only great financial but also immense administrative efforts at all levels. Of great importance is constant and effective cooperation between the Federal center and the regions, and a high level of trust among the population.

Among the problems that have not yet been resolved, the following can be emphasized:

- lack of an approved and final plan for the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons;
- incomplete definition of general methodology and specific measures for the destruction of the reacting stock;
- insufficiently intense efforts to establish at every chemical weapons storage and destruction facility a system of State ecological control and environmental monitoring;
- insufficiently effective solution of social problems in the regions of chemical weapons storage and destruction;
- an unsteady system of information support for the chemical weapons destruction process;
- passivity of the Federal authorities in the face of a possible failure to adhere to the date for the destruction of 8,000 tons of toxic agents to meet the deadlines set by the CWC, and increased attempts to shift responsibility for it onto foreign donors, above all, the USA.

To rectify the existing situation, it can be suggested to form an independent authoritative commission from among the representatives of the executive and legislative authorities, experts and scientists for an objective assessment of how realistic the present plans are for the fulfillment of the chemical weapons destruction program in Russia.

Moreover, taking into account the fact that concern has also been expressed in the USA over its possibility to meet the deadlines for the destruction of US chemical weapons stocks (instead of the time set by the Convention for the complete elimination of chemical weapons in 2012, there is now talk of 2014), Russian-American consultations need to be conducted on this issue. The result of such consultations may be a joint request to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to extend the time for the destruction of chemical weapons for the two countries that possess the biggest stocks of these weapons (Russia and the USA). Such a decision could be formalized as an additional Protocol to the CWC.

There is also need to ensure a regular and full financing of Russia's chemical weapons destruction program from the State budget and the receipt of the funds promised by foreign donors from abroad. For this purpose, the plans of building and starting the chemical weapons destruction facilities should be dovetailed to the provision of foreign assistance and a long-term plan should be adopted for the receipt of these funds.

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- ¹ The date of completion of the third stage - 2008 - is indicated in the effective (second) wording of the Federal Target Program.
- ² GAO-04-361, NONPROLIFERATION: Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Proliferation. March 2004, p. 3.
- ³ Ibid., p. 21.
- ⁴ *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, March 25-31, 2005.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ *Vremya novostei*, March 25, 2005.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, March 25-31, 2005.
- ¹¹ *Interfax ABN*, March 31, 2004, *Vremya novostei*, March 25, 2005.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, January 18, 2005.
- ¹⁴ The reference book «Global Partnership Against Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons». Moscow, PIR-Center, 2005, p. 52.
- ¹⁵ *Vremya novostei*, March 25, 2005 - May 31, 2005.
- ¹⁶ *Vremya novostei*, March 25, 2005.
- ¹⁷ *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, March 25-31, 2005.
- ¹⁸ The reference book «Global Partnership Against Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons». Moscow, PIR-Center, 2005, p. 52.
- ¹⁹ «Additional funds are required for the destruction of chemical weapons». An interview by Dm. Strugovets with N. Bezborodov, a member of the State Commission for Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD). *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* No. 26, 2004, p. 1; An interview with V. Kholstov, deputy director of the Federal Agency for Industry, May 5, 2005.
- ²⁰ The fact that a chemical weapons destruction facility is called small-scale means that «the second stage of the destruction of toxic agents will be performed not by means of bituminizing but rather by burning or taking out the reacting stock to chemical industry plants in Russia». *Vestnik khimicheskogo razoruzheniya*, No. 3, March 2004, p. 4.
- ²¹ http://kurgan.uralweb.ru/news/daily/2004-06-30/news_id-34509-region_id-5.html
- ²² <http://www.grani.ru/War/Arms/Chem/m.74116.html>
- ²³ A. Savelyev, L. Pankova. Russia at the second stage of the chemical disarmament program. 2004 SIPRI Yearbook. Armaments, disarmament and international security. Russian-language edition. Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 2005, p. 901.
- ²⁴ http://www.abnews.ru/arc_news.php?news_id=91321&page=2&d=26&m=11&y=2004
- ²⁵ http://www.programs-gov.ru/cgi-bin/news.cgi?news=159&id_news=1180
- ²⁶ N. Bezborodov. «Additional funds are required for the destruction of chemical weapons». *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, No. 26, 2004, p. 1-2.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ ITAR-TASS «Munitions Agency meets over chem. weapons disposal facility». May 26, 2005.
- ²⁹ Courier, No. 1, 2004.
- ³⁰ N. Bezborodov. «Additional funds are required for the destruction of chemical weapons». *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, No. 26, 2004, p. 1-2.
- ³¹ Based on the material «All Russia – News From Regions», April 27, 2004, and of the Kirov Information Center.
- ³² *Lenta.ru*. April 22, 2004.
- ³³ PMZ is an area around a chemical weapons storage facility or a chemical weapons destruction facility, and within the limits of such an area a special set of measures is carried on, aimed at ensuring the collective and individual protection of the citizens, and environment protection from a possible impact of toxic materials in case of an emergency situation. The Government of Russia approves the area of a PMZ.
- ³⁴ Kalinina N.I. «Social protection of the citizens who live and work in protective measures zones: main problems and needed solutions». *Vestnik khimicheskogo razoruzheniya*, No. 3, 2004, p. 1.

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